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Do Global Value Chains Enhance Economic 
Upgrading?  





Exporting through global value chains (GVCs) has recently been highlighted as a panacea for 
weak industrialisation trends in the South. We study the long-run effects of GVC participation 
for a large set of countries between 1970 and 2008. We find strong evidence for the positive 
effects on productivity growth in the formal manufacturing sector. This effect is stronger when 
the gap with the global productivity frontier is larger. However, we find no evidence for a 
positive effect on employment generation. These findings also hold in analyses of sub-sets of 







This chapter is co-authored with Marcel P. Timmer, and based on Pahl and Timmer (2019a). 
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3 Do Global Value Chains Enhance Economic Upgrading? A Long View. 
3.1 Introduction 
Economic development relies on productivity growth driven by a reallocation of labour from 
less to more productive activities. Traditionally, a key role is attributed to the manufacturing 
sector, which is argued to provide abundant opportunities for capital intensification, scale and 
technological change. Many studies have shown that poor countries that caught up did so by 
starting a long process of industrialisation. Conversely, countries lagging in manufacturing 
growth or even suffering from deindustrialisation have not been able to increase incomes over 
a sustained period (de Vries et al. 2015; Haraguchi et al., 2017; McMillan et al, 2014; Rodrik, 
2016; Szirmai and Verspagen, 2015).  
 
Exporting through global value chain (GVC) participation has recently been highlighted as a 
possible panacea for weak industrialisation trends (e.g. Taglioni and Winkler, 2016; World 
Bank, 2017; 2020). Due to improved information and communication technologies, poor 
countries can nowadays access global markets by carrying out particular stages in the 
production process (Baldwin, 2014, 2016). Industrialisation through exporting is thus seen as 
‘easier’ than ever, requiring few capabilities of firms and depending more on a country’s macro-
economic stability and easy physical access to global markets. It is argued that participating in 
GVCs can stimulate productivity growth through a myriad of channels. These include benefits 
from specialisation in core tasks, access to imported inputs, knowledge spillovers from 
multinationals and pro-competitive effects of global competition (Criscuolo and Timmis, 
2017). In a cross-country regression, Rodrik (2013) finds that lagging countries catch up with 
the world productivity leader in manufacturing, independent of country characteristics.  
Yet, economic development requires that productivity convergence goes hand in hand 
with sustained employment growth in the modern sector of the economy. From this perspective, 
fast productivity growth in manufacturing might be a mixed blessing. Rodrik (2013) advances 
the hypothesis that firms that participate in GVCs might be successful at absorbing advanced 
technologies but less so in employing labour. Similarly, Baldwin (2014) suggests that GVCs 
might facilitate entry into global manufacturing goods markets, initially boosting productivity 
and employment, but at the same time making industrialisation less meaningful as capability 
building is not guaranteed and long-run development might be stunted. Rodrik (2018) further 
argues that the technologies associated with GVC production provide diminishing possibilities 
of substitution of unskilled labour for other factors of production. Producing for global markets 
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demands increasing levels of precision and adherence to quality standards, which requires more 
automation and less manual work. This makes it harder for developing countries to put their 
abundant unskilled labour to use. Furthermore, he stresses that skill-biased technologies, such 
as robotisation, reduce relative demand for unskilled labour and might ultimately reverse 
patterns of comparative advantage in manufacturing. This leads to reshoring of off-shored 
stages to advanced countries in the longer run. As a result, GVC participation of developing 
countries might benefit a small group of highly productive firms but provide limited 
opportunities for employment (see also Rodrik, 2014). We will refer to this as the ‘mixed-
blessing hypothesis’ of GVC participation.  
 
A number of recent studies attempt to quantify the effects of GVC participation on economic 
growth. Kummritz et al. (2017) find that GVC integration generally increases an industry’s 
value added, especially when participating in upstream stages. They additionally highlight the 
importance of country-specific characteristics and policy for benefitting from trade integration. 
Constantinescu et al. (2019) find that participation in GVCs is a significant driver of labour 
productivity in a set of 40 countries since 1995, in particular finding strong effects of the use of 
imported inputs in production for exports.24 Lopez-Gonzalez (2016) also finds (short-run) 
positive effects from importing intermediates on a country’s value added as well as on 
employment, in particular in services. Yet, these studies are based on datasets that are limited 
in the coverage of countries (mostly high- and middle-income countries) and/or time (from 
1995 onwards). The aim of this chapter is to put the mixed-blessing hypothesis of GVC 
participation to the test using a wider set of countries, in particular including more lower-
income countries, and for a longer time period, tracking development from 1970 onwards as 
GVC development has a much longer history (e.g., Gereffi, 1999). 
 
A large and related literature has investigated FDI spillovers and arrives at a broad consensus 
in favour of positive productivity spillovers to industries that supply multinationals through 
backward linkages (Javorcik, 2014), with little evidence for other channels though (Iršova and 
Havránek, 2013). Collier and Venables (2007) argue that trade agreements that allow for 
specialisation in GVCs increase export competitiveness. They find that less developed countries 
especially benefit from preferential trade preferences with soft rules of origin, allowing for more 
fine-grained GVC specialisation. Sen (2019) finds that overall trade integration has a positive 
 
24 See also Kummritz (2016) on labour productivity effects. 
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impact on manufacturing employment in developing countries via the expansion of the scale of 
production. However, it has a negative impact via the productivity effect as less labour is needed 
per unit of output. Moreover, positive employment effects appear to peter out once domestic 
wages for unskilled workers start to rise, as follows from surplus-labour models in the vein of 
Arthur Lewis (Lewis, 1954; Sen, 2019). More qualitative studies on GVCs are in general critical 
about the opportunities for upgrading through GVC participation in the long run (Gereffi, 1994; 
Kaplinsky, 2000; Barrientos et al., 2016). They highlight governance structures with 
asymmetric power relationships between lead firms in advanced countries and suppliers from 
developing regions, such that firms are often locked in low-value activities (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2002). Escaping from such captive governance structures may only be possible under 
the right domestic conditions, such as well-functioning domestic innovation systems offering 
ample opportunity to absorb and assimilate new technologies (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2011). 
Such demanding preconditions for success were present in South Korea and Taiwan in the past, 
but may not be in place in the average developing country today.  
 
To investigate the mixed-blessing hypothesis, we introduce new measures of domestic value 
added and employment generated by exporting and relate them to GVC participation. The 
hallmark of GVC participation is specialisation in particular tasks in the production chain such 
that a country may only add part of the value of the exported good. In an already classic case 
study, Dedrick et al. (2010) find that China mainly performs assembly, testing and packaging 
activities on imported high-tech components in order to export high-end electronics, while 
relying on software, supply chain orchestration and branding from foreign companies. 
Following the seminal contribution of Hummels et al. (2001), we use a measure of vertical 
specialisation in trade as the main indicator for GVC participation, which is standard in this 
literature (e.g., Kummritz et al., 2017; Constantinescu et al., 2019). For outcome measurement, 
we measure all manufacturing value added and employment in a country that is generated in 
the production for exports, not only in the exporting industry, but also in upstream industries. 
Traditionally, studies (such as discussed above) focus only on growth in the industry or the 
firms that actually export. Yet, with production fragmentation other domestic firms might 
benefit through delivering inputs to the exporting firms. One might even argue that the 
establishment of backward linkages into the domestic sectors is a hallmark of success in 
benefitting from trade. This idea is far from new, going back at least to Hirschmann (1958) (see 
also Chenery et al., 1986), but until now the generation of employment in upstream stages of 
production has not been measured for a large set of countries over a long period. We study the 
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period from 1970 to 2008 and analyse trends in up to 58 countries. We draw on disaggregated 
data from UNIDO’s Indstat2 (2016) on manufacturing value added and employment (i.e., 
number of workers), and on national input-output tables from Pahl and Timmer (2019b).  
 
In econometric analyses, we find robust evidence for a strong positive association of GVC 
participation with labour productivity growth in the export chain. This result is robust to 
different specifications and holds for subsets of developing countries. Moreover, this effect 
becomes larger the further a country is from the productivity frontier. This is found in analyses 
of 10-year periods, and we obtain qualitatively similar results in analyses of 5-year periods. In 
contrast, we do not find evidence for positive effects on employment growth. If anything, we 
find a negative association between GVC participation and employment growth for countries 
close to the productivity frontier. Hence, the results suggest that, on average, higher GVC 
participation is not necessarily associated with higher employment generation in 
manufacturing. This is in line with the mixed-blessing hypothesis.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In section 3.2, we outline the methodology to 
measure value added and employment in a country’s exports. In section 3.3, we describe the 
data sources used, with additional detail in the supplementary material (3.7). In section 3.4, we 
econometrically relate our export performance measures to GVC participation, and we discuss 
results and robustness. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 The concept of value added and employment in exports 
With the emergence of GVCs, the economic effects of exporting become less visible, as they 
materialise not only in the exporting industry, but also in all other domestic industries that 
deliver intermediates, an old idea going back to at least Hirschmann (1958), see also Chenery 
et al. (1986). We illustrate this in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Domestic value chains in export production 
 
Source: Authors’ illustration. 
 
Domestic value added in exports (and employment in exports) is a composite of domestic 
activities by several firms in multiple industries. Directly exporting firms in industry A generate 
value added by producing exports. The exported value however is also composed of value 
added that is generated by other domestic firms. This may include indirect contributions of 
firms within the exporting industry, but also contributions from firms in other industries. We 
distinguish for the purpose of this chapter between formal manufacturing (represented by 
industry B), informal manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. Those indirect 
contributions can be sizeable and depend on the strength of backward linkages to domestic 
firms.  
To measure domestic employment and value added in exports we are using the value 
chains as opposed to generic industries as units of analysis. We define domestic value chains 
by the exporting industry (industry A in Figure 3.1). The domestic value chain includes all 
domestic direct and indirect contributions to these exports, but excludes the foreign content 
(imported intermediates).25 Our analysis explicitly focuses on employment in formal 
manufacturing,  arguably providing the most desirable jobs in terms of working conditions and 
 
25 Studies using firm-level data cannot account for these indirect contributions. Typically, importing and 
exporting firms themselves are considered but not their production linkages to other domestic firms (see Del 
Prete et al., 2017; Foster-McGregor et al., 2014; Okafor et al., 2017). 
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pay (see e.g. Rodrik, 2013). This is not to deny the importance of informal job creation, but 
foremost reflects the paucity of data on output and employment in the informal sectors. In our 
data, the share of these indirect formal manufacturing contributions reaches more than 40 
percent in the upper decile of our sample.26 This variation matters cross-sectionally and inter-
temporally. In South Korea, for example, the share of indirect formal manufacturing 
employment to products exported by the automotive industry varies between 35 and 50 percent 
between 1970 and 2008. 
 
3.2.2 The measurement of value added and employment in exports 
The implementation is based on using information from input-output tables. We follow 
Koopman et al. (2014) and Los et al. (2016) and define the domestic value-added content in 
exports (VAXD) as: 
 
𝑉𝐴𝑋𝐷 = 𝐯(𝐈 − 𝐀𝐝𝐨𝐦)
(−𝟏) 𝐞   
(1) 
where v is a row vector of value added to gross output ratios (i.e., value added per unit of 
output), I is an identity matrix, 𝐀𝐝𝐨𝐦 is a matrix of domestic input coefficients and e a column 
vector of exports. Multiplying the Leontief inverse (𝐈 − 𝐀𝐝𝐨𝐦)
(−𝟏) with the export vector e 
identifies how much output is generated in any sector of the economy to produce the export 
vector, that is, in all firms that are directly and indirectly exporting. Pre-multiplying with v 
identifies how much value added is generated in these sectors when producing the needed 
output. If instead pre-multiplied by a row vector of employment inputs to gross output ratios, 
the left-hand side captures how much employment is needed to produce the exports. We refer 
to this as employment in exports. Labour productivity in exports is defined as value added in 
exports divided by employment in exports. We can calculate these measures for exports 
originating from any manufacturing industry through appropriate choice of the export vector. 
 
How to measure GVC participation of a country? We use a measure of vertical specialisation 
in trade which is standard in the literature by now, introduced by Hummels et al. (2001) and 
used, for example, in Kummritz et al. (2017) and Constantinescu et al. (2019). More 
specifically, our measure of GVC participation (G) is the imported input content in exports, 
 
26 The direct effect is value added and employment generated by exporting firms only. In input-output terms, we 
define it as the vector of value-added to gross output ratios times the export vector. 
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which is equal to gross exports (X) minus VAX-D (see Los et al., 2016). We express it as a 
share of gross exports, such that G is bound between zero and one:  
 
𝐺 = (𝑋 − 𝑉𝐴𝑋𝐷)/𝑋 .          
(2) 
A ratio close to one indicates that an exporting industry is relying heavily on imported 
intermediates and GVC participation is thus high, and vice versa. 
 
This GVC participation measure is a so-called backward linkage indicator. It is particularly 
well-suited for analysing countries that initiate assembly activities based on imported parts and 
components, or put differently, that are active in downstream activities in the chain. It is less 
well-suited to trace the benefits of GVC participation for countries that are mostly involved in 
upstream activities that do not require sophisticated inputs, such as in early phases of processing 
natural resources or food. To this end, some studies have also used so-called forward indicators, 
which capture the share of an industry’s value added that is used by other countries in 
production of their exports, see for example Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015) and 
Kummritz et al. (2017). Kummritz et al. (2017) refer to this as integration in a GVC as a ‘seller’ 
rather than a ‘buyer’. They stress the importance of knowledge spillovers that are not embodied 
or necessarily associated with the buying of inputs, such as those that arise from implementation 
of global standards or training supported by the global retail firms (e.g., Ivarsson and Alvstam, 
2010). The calculation of this forward measure requires full inter-country input-output tables 
(rather than national tables), which are not available for a wide set of countries. Moreover, our 
focus is on growth in manufacturing industries rather than in natural resource industries, such 
as agriculture and mining. Yet, there might also be differences across manufacturing products. 
We explore this issue through splitting our sample according to the level of technological 
sophistication of the inputs used.  
 
3.3 Data sources 
To implement our methodology, we build a new dataset by combining two data sources: one 
on formal manufacturing employment and value added and one on national input-output tables. 
We obtain a dataset of 58 countries, of which 38 are developing countries as classified by the 
World Bank in 1990 (see Table 3.A1 in the appendix). For series of formal manufacturing 
employment and value added, we use UNIDO’s Indstat2 (2016). This database provides data 
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for a large set of developing countries over a long period and is therefore suited for our long-
run analysis. Supplementary material section C provides a detailed description of the data 
construction and a summary table on each country. However, we would like to stress two points 
of relevance for interpreting our results here. 
 
Firstly, the UNIDO data are collected from national industrial surveys and censuses, which are 
based on samples of manufacturing establishments. These surveys typically exclude small-scale 
and informal establishments. Depending on the survey, it might cover firms with at least five, 
or ten, formally employed workers. In many developing countries, the informal workforce 
makes up a large share of manufacturing employment, which is thus not covered in these 
surveys. We therefore stress that our results apply to the productivity and employment effects 
in formal manufacturing production. Rodrik (2013) points out that it is jobs in the modern sector 
of the economy that are missing in most low-income countries. Such jobs might be created 
anew through starting and expanding modern activities in a GVC, or they may arise due to 
transitioning of informal firms to formal status (see La Porta and Shleifer, 2008, who argue that 
the latter is not very common).  
Secondly, the UNIDO data, nor national input-output tables, make a distinction between 
export-related production and production for domestic demand. This is because there is no 
separate information on input use by type of firm (exporting or not). It is generally found that 
exporting firms use greater shares of imports in production than firms that do not export (e.g. 
Koopman et al., 2012 on China and de Gortari, 2019 on Mexico), and they typically also have 
a higher labour productivity level. As we only have data on all firms in the industry, the first 
might lead to an underestimation of the GVC participation level in our approach, and the latter 
may lead to an overestimation of the level of employment in exports. Yet, in order to affect our 
regression results, there needs to be a particular bias in the growth rates of employment (as our 
dependent variable is in growth rates) and this bias must be systematically related to the level 
of GVC participation. While we do not rule out this possibility, we are not aware of any a priori 
reasons why this would be the case, as it will depend on the unknown covariation of changes 
in the productivity gap between exporters and non-exporters, and changes in their shares in 
overall industry employment. In any case, this measurement issue provides an important and 
more general caveat pertaining to any study that estimates the employment and value-added 
content of exports with input-output tables that do not distinguish between exporters and non-
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exporters. Further improvements in data for a large cross-section of countries on both fronts 
would need to be awaited.27 
 
When using UNIDO’s Indstat2 (2016), we need to apply harmonisation strategies. The data 
exhibit a large amount of gaps and changes of classifications, which make time-series 
comparisons erroneous and the data not readily usable. Value added is available at three 
different price concepts (in basic prices, in purchaser’s prices and in an unknown price concept), 
and employment is available for two different measures (as persons engaged and as 
employees).28 Our construction is therefore guided to maximise intertemporal (over time), 
internal (between variables), and international (cross-country) consistency. To assure 
intertemporal consistency, which is most important in the long-run productivity comparisons 
of this chapter, we apply linking procedures. After careful harmonisation and aggregation, we 
start with an initial cross-section of both variables and link a series of growth rates to the 
respective cross-section. Hence, we obtain the initial level from the raw data, but we are able 
to repair breaks from changes in revisions or classifications of activities by using trends in the 
different series. When constructing these growth rates, we fill gaps (e.g., due to lack of overlap) 
by additional data sources and assumptions, which we describe in the supplementary material. 
Internal consistency between value added and employment is generally high as both 
variables come from the same type of sources, which are industrial censuses and surveys of the 
manufacturing sector. The initial values to which we link the series therefore come from the 
same year in both variables, yielding highest internal consistency. International consistency is 
most difficult to achieve, but it is also least critical in our analysis. We aggregate all variables 
to the same internationally comparable ISIC Rev.3.1 combinations, such that we cover in 
principle the same activities. Actual coverage of the industrial censuses may of course still 
differ (e.g., through different threshold levels of the minimum establishment size). As the 
dependent variable is in growth rates in the econometric analysis, this thus matters only if, for 
example, productivity growth in larger firms is different from smaller firms (which are not 
covered in all countries in the industrial surveys). It is also not possible to use the same 
classification of variables across all countries because some only report in basic prices and 
 
27 Bems and Kikkawa (2019) investigate the aggregation bias in macro data by comparing the GVC participation 
measure (vertical specialisation) as obtained from macro data (as used here) with one based on firm-level data. 
They find indeed relatively large differences for China and Vietnam, as expected. Yet, they find only small 
differences for the remaining countries, namely for Belgium, Chile, India, Indonesia, Korea and Latvia. 
28 Ideally, one would like to have hours worked as the measure of labour input. Data on hours worked is 
notoriously hard to find, in particular for low-income countries. 
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others only in market prices. We can control for a large part of such cross-country differences 
by including dummies. Country dummies account for level differences that arise from different 
price concepts, and capture systematic differences in growth rates related to establishment size. 
SM Table 3.5 in the supplementary material provides a more detailed overview, indicating the 
covered years and underlying sources. 
 
For the input-output tables, we rely on Pahl and Timmer (2019b), which construct a time series 
of national input-output tables for 91 countries since 1970. Importantly, this dataset provides 
estimates of 𝐀𝐝𝐨𝐦 and 𝐞, required to implement equation 1. The industry detail is 14 
manufacturing industries and 5 broad non-manufacturing sectors. Details on this data source 
are provided in the supplementary material of chapter 2 in this thesis, but we repeat key 
characteristics here. The series of our 58 countries are based on annual data of trade flows, 
value added and output at a detailed industry level and final demand totals. Importantly, value 
added to gross output ratios are a key ingredient when constructing input-output tables, as they 
pin down intermediate use in an industry. Annual variation in those is often not achieved for 
developing countries at the level of detailed manufacturing industries. Using UNIDO’s Indstat2 
(2016), however, fills this gap.29 Those series of trade flows and production data are combined 
with benchmark input-output tables to construct time series of 𝐀𝐝𝐨𝐦. In the process, the import 
matrix is obtained by the conventional proportionality assumption (after identifying 
intermediates). That is, it is assumed that imported products are used in the same way as 
domestically produced products. 
 
A last important issue pertains to the fact that all value data discussed so far is in nominal US$. 
To study developments over time, one needs to account for price developments that may vary 
greatly across different types of outputs and inputs (e.g., prices of raw materials have shown 
large swings over the studied period). To account for such price effects, we follow Rodrik 
(2013) and add time period-industry dummies in all our regressions. This is based on the 
assumption that traded products follow the law of one price (and we are only considering 
exported products). The necessary assumption is that dollar inflation terms are industry-specific 
and do not vary across countries (except for an idiosyncratic random error term). Hence, we 
can write growth of real labour productivity in exports of industry i in country c over period t 
 
29 Note that in chapter 2, UNIDO’s Indstat is used as an estimate to split the total (formal and informal) 
manufacturing sector. In this chapter, output and value added from UNIDO are directly used because we focus 
on formal manufacturing. Differences in the obtained variables are generally small. 





𝑛𝑜?̂? + 𝜋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡, where nom indicates nominal (dollar) labour productivity, 𝜋𝑖𝑡 
is the inflation term of products in industry i over period t and  𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error 
term. As can be seen, industry-time period dummies absorb the inflation term and thereby 
control for price effects. This holds as long as exported manufactured products face common 
world price trends, and the independent variables in the regression (see equation 3 below) are 
not systematically correlated to deviations from this world price trend.  
 
3.4 Empirical results 
We investigate the relationship between GVC participation and growth of employment and 
labour productivity in long-run periods at the level of individual value chains. We identify 
chains by the country-industry that exports, so in total there are 754 (58 countries with 13 
industries).30 Our dataset covers an unbalanced panel over the period 1970 to 2008. To focus 
on long-term developments, we use three 10-year periods going backward from 2008, and one 
8-year period 1970 to 1978. For each country-industry, we thus observe up to four periods.  
 
To explore the relationship, we rank our observations by level of GVC participation at the 
beginning of each period pooled across country-industries and time periods. We define the top 
quartile of these observations as the group with ‘high GVC participation’ and the bottom 
quartile as the group with ‘low GVC participation’. In Table 3.1, we present one-sided t-tests 
for differences in means of labour productivity and employment growth between the two 
groups. The group with ‘high GVC participation’ appears to have higher growth rates of labour 
productivity, but not of employment. The mean of labour productivity growth is 0.067 for 
observations with low GVC participation, and 0.073 for observations with high GVC 
participation in the full set of countries. In the subset of developing countries, it is 0.055 and 
0.080 respectively. These differences in means are statistically significant, as shown in Table 
3.1, especially for developing countries. For employment, however, there is much weaker 
evidence for a relationship. Table 3.1 shows the means of the two distributions, which are 0.051 
for low and 0.049 for high participation in the set of all countries. For developing countries, 
value chains with low GVC participation also experience faster growth of employment: 0.077 
(low) against 0.071 (high). These differences are not statistically significant however. Taken 
 
30 We exclude ISIC Rev.3 industry 23, ‘Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel’. It appears to be an important 
outlier. Apart from statistical concerns, another reason to exclude it is its large dependency on oil, which exhibits 
highly volatile prices (see also section SM B).   
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together, these results suggest that higher GVC participation might contribute positively to 
labour productivity growth, but not to employment growth.  
 





participation     
  Mean Mean t-value p-value 
All countries     









          
Developing countries only     









Note: ‘High GVC participation’ are all observations in the top quartile of the respective distribution of the GVC 
participation index. ‘Low GVC participation’ are all observations in the bottom quartile of the distribution. There 
are 57 countries of which 37 are developing ones: Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, India, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Rumania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay. 
Source: Authors’ calculation on described dataset. 
 
3.4.1 Econometric model 
To investigate the issue in full, we estimate the following model: 
 
𝑙?̂?𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑐,𝑡−10+ 𝛽2𝑙𝑝𝑖𝑐,𝑡−10 + 𝛽3(𝑙𝑝𝑖𝑐,𝑡−10 × 𝐺𝑖𝑐,𝑡−10) + 𝐶𝑐 + 𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡,  
(3) 
where i is exporting industry, c is country, t is time period and 𝜀 is the error term. In the baseline 
model, the time periods are 10 years and 𝑙?̂? is accordingly growth of labour productivity in 
exports over these 10 years. All independent variables are measured at the start of each time 
period (indicated by t-10, depicting the start of the respective period). The main variable of 
interest is GVC participation, measured by our participation index and abbreviated by G. 
Following Rodrik (2013), we add time period-industry dummies 𝑇𝑖𝑡 to account for price 
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developments.31 We also add country dummies, 𝐶𝑐, to control for country-fixed effects. These 
may include potential cross-country differences in the measurement of value added and 
employment as described in section 3.3. They also pick up effects due to country-size 
differences, since it is well known that larger countries tend to have lower GVC participation 
because more intermediates are domestically available (e.g., Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 
2015; Timmer et al., 2013). 
We also add the nominal labour productivity level (𝑙𝑝) at the beginning of each period 
as an explanatory variable. As all our regressions include time period-industry dummies, lp is 
measured relative to the global productivity frontier (which varies only by industry and time 
period). As shown in Rodrik (2013), patterns of unconditional convergence are strong in 
manufacturing. Lagging countries can benefit from the availability of information and codified 
knowledge, which helps them to learn from earlier innovations and thus catch up. Our 
specification identifies whether there is any additional effect of participating in GVCs beyond 
an unconditional trend of convergence. Countries that engage in GVCs might additionally 
benefit, for example, from direct production assistance and use of sophisticated inputs 
embodying technology. We also add an interaction term (lp x G) to study whether the effect of 
GVC participation depends on the distance to the productivity frontier. We would expect that 
the productivity effects operate especially in value chains where the productivity level is further 
from the productivity frontier, since this might offer more scope for learning. 
We use cluster-robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. Errors are 
clustered at the cross-sectional identifier, that is, the country-industry dimension. All our 
independent variables are in log-terms. We run regressions for long 10-year periods as well as 
for shorter medium-run 5-year periods (section SM B), following the same regression set up. 
 
Our model for explaining employment growth follows a similar set-up. The full model is given 
by: 
 
𝑒𝑚?̂?𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑐,𝑡−10 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑝𝑖𝑐,𝑡−10 + 𝛽3(𝑙𝑝𝑖𝑐,𝑡−10 × 𝐺𝑖𝑐,𝑡−10) + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑐,𝑡−10 +
𝛽5𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑐,𝑡−10 + 𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡, 
(4) 
 
31 Value added is in nominal dollars and we assume that the inflation term is only product (and not country) 
specific by the law of one price for internationally traded products (see section 3.3). 
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where 𝑒𝑚?̂? is growth of employment in exports. Again, all independent variables are measured 
at the beginning of each time period (indicated by t-10, depicting the start of the respective 
period). We add time period-industry dummies to control for fluctuations in world demand. For 
example, world demand for ‘automotives’ might develop differently than demand for ‘food and 
beverages’ and thus affect employment growth in these value chains. We also add human 
capital (Hum) and regulatory institutions (Reg) as additional control variables at the country-
level, based on the following arguments summarised, for example, in Sen (2019). There is a 
large literature arguing that stricter labour market regulations may have detrimental effects on 
employment generation. For example, labour market regulations may create adjustment costs 
to which firms may respond by reducing labour demand (Heckman and Pages, 2004). 
Furthermore, labour market regulations may increase the bargaining power of workers, 
potentially reducing investments and the scale of production (Besley and Burgess, 2004). If 
true, we can expect a negative association with employment growth in exports. We measure 
labour market institutions by a component of the Index of Economic Freedom (Fraser Institute, 
2015). As the detailed index of labour market regulations is not available for a large set of 
countries before 1980, we use a more aggregate component for all periods. This component 
broadly captures ‘regulation’ and also includes measures on the business and credit market 
environment. It is available every 5-years and we therefore linearly interpolate between these 
years to obtain measures at the beginning of each studied period.32 
We also include an indicator for the level of human capital (Hum). A highly skilled 
workforce may imply a comparative advantage in skill-intensive activities (Wood and Berge, 
1997). For developing countries, this might imply specialisation in manufacturing activities as 
opposed to primary production within the manufacturing value chains and thus might have a 
positive effect on manufacturing employment growth (for a similar argument, see Sen, 2019). 
However, it could also imply a shift towards capital-intensive production if skilled labour and 
capital are complements in the production process (in the spirit of, e.g., Acemoglu and Pischke, 
1998). We obtain human capital stock at the country level from PWT9.0 (Feenstra et al., 2015). 
This index is a combination based on the average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2013) 
and an assumed rate of return to education from Psacharopoulos (1994).  
 
32 We have also obtained the measure of labour market rigidities by Campos and Nugent (2018), which is 
available for 5-year intervals. Our results on GVC participation and on the other variables do not change. Using 
this variable, we find that labour market rigidities are negatively correlated to employment growth. However, 
these data are not available for Cyprus and Hungary (only recent years) of our covered countries.   
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We also add labour productivity. We might expect that value chains closer to the 
productivity frontier have slower employment growth, because these value chains are more 
likely to be substituting away from labour to capital, following the lead of more developed 
countries that typically specialise in more capital-intensive activities as wages rise. On the other 
hand, high relative labour productivity might also signal low unit labour costs and allow 
countries to capture a larger share of world demand, increase the scale of production and 
generate employment growth. We also investigate whether the effect of GVC participation 
depends on the distance to the productivity frontier by inclusion of an interaction term between 
participation and labour productivity. One might expect that only countries far from the 
productivity frontier benefit from participation as they specialise in labour-intensive production 
stages when engaging in GVCs, while developed countries offshore labour-intensive stages and 
attract capital-intensive ones.  
Lastly, we also present all specifications with country dummies to control for the 
country averages in the participation index and measurement differences. Adding country 
dummies might further be useful to control for (time-invariant) wage differences across 
countries. Lower wages might make it easier to attract labour-intensive production stages and 
thus yield employment growth. Explicitly controlling for wages is difficult, as wages are only 
rarely systematically collected and therefore not available for a broad set of countries and 
industries over a long time period.  
Summary statistics of our main variables are given in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2 Summary statistics: 10-year periods 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Growth of employment 2,088 0.05 0.11 -0.67 0.95 
Growth of labour productivity 2,088 0.07 0.06 -0.18 0.38 
Labour productivity level (ln) 2,088 9.34 1.12 5.61 12.71 
GVC participation (ln) 2,088 -1.55 0.60 -3.63 -0.28 
Human Capital 2,088 2.41 0.53 1.19 3.52 
Regulatory institutions 2,088 6.09 1.12 2.15 8.44 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on described dataset. 
 
We would further like to stress that our results show associations between GVC participation 
and economic outcomes, rather than causal effects. In particular, the regression set-up is 
potentially plagued by reverse causality. High productivity growth, for example, may be the 
pre-requisite for integration into GVCs. We partly address this issue by using the level of GVC 
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participation at the beginning of each period and correlate it to the subsequent growth of labour 
productivity. However, this only partially addresses the problem in case labour productivity 
growth is serially correlated. For this reason, we strictly refrain from stating any causal 
relationships.  
 
3.4.2 Main results 
We begin by discussing the results on labour productivity growth in exports. Table 3.3 shows 
the regression results for our long-run (10-year) periods. Without any controls (except the time 
period-industry dummies), we find a strong positive and significant relationship between GVC 
participation and labour productivity growth (column 1). A 1-percent increase in the GVC 
participation index is associated with a 0.010 percentage point higher growth rate. This implies 
a 0.8 percentage-point increase in the growth rate if a chain increases its participation from the 
25th to the 75th percentile in our sample. In column 2, we add dummies to account for country-
fixed effects. The coefficient almost doubles and is still statistically distinguishable from zero. 
A 1-percent increase in GVC participation is associated with a 0.019 percentage-point increase 
in the growth rate, implying a 1.5 percentage-point increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile 
of GVC participation. 
 
In columns 3 and 4, we add initial labour productivity level in exports and the interaction with 
GVC participation. Consistent with Rodrik’s (2013) finding on convergence, the effect of initial 
labour productivity is negative and statistically different from zero (for all levels of GVC 
participation). The coefficient of GVC participation is positive, while the coefficient on the 
interaction is negative. This suggests that the effect of GVC participation is stronger for 
countries that are further from the productivity frontier. To show this, we graph the marginal 
effects of the changes in the participation index by different levels of labour productivity for 
the result of column 3 in Figure 3.2. It shows that the effect of GVC participation is positive 
and significantly different from zero for all value chains with labour productivity (ln) lower 
than or equal to 10, which is the 69th percentile of our sample. For the least productive country-
industries in our sample, the coefficient increases up to 0.034 implying a rise in labour 
productivity growth of 2.6 percentage points when increasing participation from the 25th to the 
75th percentile in our sample, holding everything else constant. The estimated effect is not 
significantly different from zero for observations with labour productivity larger than 10, and 
turns significantly negative for countries with initial labour productivity (ln) of 11.5. This 
Do Global Value Chains Enhance Economic Upgrading? A Long View. 
85 
 
corresponds approximately to the top 1 percent of our sample. This strongly suggest an 
association between GVC participation and labour productivity growth in long-run periods, 





Table 3.3 GVC participation and labour productivity in exports growth 
Dependent variable: Growth of formal manufacturing labour productivity in exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








         
GVC participation (ln) 0.0104*** 0.0198*** 0.0733*** 0.0566*** 0.0214*** 0.0139** 0.0328*** 0.0282*** 
 (0.00191) (0.00370) (0.0148) (0.0151) (0.00497) (0.00545) (0.00741) (0.00617) 
Labour productivity (ln)   -0.0249*** -0.0650***     
   (0.00263) (0.00367)     
GVC Participation x labour 
productivity 
  -0.00706*** -0.00559***     
  (0.00154) (0.00164)     
GVC participation x Asia      0.0225***   
      (0.00730)   
GVC participation x light Mfg       -0.00985  
       (0.00789)  
GVC participation x resource-based 
Mfg 
      -0.0156**  
      (0.00690)  
Constant 0.138*** 0.185*** 0.356*** 0.694*** 0.167*** 0.152*** 0.158*** 0.171*** 
 (0.00783) (0.0183) (0.0257) (0.0323) (0.0233) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0277) 
         
Observations 2,088 2,088 2,088 2,088 1,152 1,152 1,152 992 
Countries 57 57 57 57 37 37 37 24 
Adjusted R-squared 0.341 0.530 0.395 0.660 0.461 0.466 0.463 0.481 
Time period-industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All independent variables are measured at the beginning of each period. 
Columns 5 to 7 are based on the sample of developing countries, as defined by income status in 1990 (see Table 3.A1). Asia is a dummy that is one for all East and South-
East Asian countries. Industry dummies in column 7 are described in the text. Non-manufacturing in column 8 is included for a subset of countries, as described in the main 
text. 




Table 3.4 GVC participation and employment in exports growth 
Dependent variable: Growth of formal manufacturing employment in exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








         
GVC participation (ln) -0.00398 -0.00102 0.0849*** 0.0813*** -0.00239 0.000807 0.00149 -0.0116 
 
(0.00392) (0.00758) (0.0286) (0.0312) (0.0102) (0.0120) (0.0149) (0.0108) 
Labour productivity (ln)   -0.0136*** 0.0140     
 
  (0.00500) (0.00950)     
GVC Participation x labour 
productivity 
  -0.00958*** -0.00870***     
  (0.00288) (0.00335)     
Human capital   -0.0572***      
   (0.00634)      
Regulatory environment   -0.000104      
   (0.00185)      
GVC participation x Asia      -0.00954   
 
     (0.0149)   
GVC participation x light Mfg       -0.0121  
 
      (0.0165)  
GVC participation x resource-
based Mfg 
      -0.00225  
      (0.0153)  
Constant 0.0265* 0.0151 0.282*** -0.0875 0.0127 0.0191 0.0156 0.0313 
 
(0.0139) (0.0267) (0.0547) (0.0778) (0.0403) (0.0420) (0.0421) (0.0418) 
         
Observations 2,088 2,088 2,088 2,088 1,152 1,152 1,152 992 
Countries 57 57 57 57 37 37 37 24 
Adjusted R-squared 0.080 0.215 0.142 0.225 0.178 0.177 0.177 0.210 
Time period-industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All independent variables are measured at the beginning of each period. 
Columns 5 to 7 are based on the sample of developing countries, as defined by income status in 1990 (see Table 3.A1). Asia is a dummy that is one for all East and South-
East Asian countries. Industry dummies in column 7 are described in the text. Non-manufacturing in column 8 is included for a subset of countries, as described in the main 
text. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on described datasets.     
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Figure 3.2 Marginal effects of GVC participation on labour productivity growth, by levels of 
labour productivity in exports 
 
Note: Marginal effects are obtained from regression of Table 3.3, column 3. Confidence interval for 95%.  
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
 
Figure 3.3 Marginal effects of GVC participation on employment growth, by levels of labour 
productivity in exports 
 
Note: Marginal effects are obtained from regression of Table 3.4, column 3. Confidence interval for 95%.  
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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We next investigate the relation between GVC participation and employment growth. Results 
are given in Table 3.4 (all specifications include time period-industry dummies). Our baseline 
regression indicates that employment growth in exports appears not to be associated with GVC 
participation. The estimated coefficient is small in magnitude and not different from zero 
(column 1), and is even closer to zero when adding country dummies (column 2). This is in 
strong contrast with our findings on labour productivity growth and confirms the t-tests in Table 
3.1. In columns 3 and 4, we add the interaction with labour productivity. In column 3, we also 
add country-level control variables, which we drop in column 4 when we add country dummies, 
as the controls vary only little over time. Of our control variables in column 3, human capital 
is significantly (negatively) associated with employment growth. This negative association 
might be because of a complementarity between high-skilled workers and capital. Availability 
of skills might yield a shift to more capital-intensive methods of production and thus reduce 
employment.  
 
In both columns 3 and 4, the sign of the coefficient of GVC participation is positive, and the 
sign of the interaction is negative, suggesting a similar relationship as for labour productivity. 
Figure 3.3 shows the marginal effects based on column 3. It suggests that the association turns 
significantly positive for the very least productive value chains with lower labour productivity 
(ln) than 7. Yet, this constitutes less than 2 percent of our sample. We find, however, that it is 
significantly negative for value chains with labour productivity (ln) larger than about 9.5, which 
corresponds to about 45 per cent of our sample. In conclusion, these results show that there is 
no strong positive association between GVC participation and employment growth in exports. 
If anything, GVC participation is even associated with slower employment growth for relatively 
productive value chains. 
 
In the supplementary material (SM B), we provide two robustness tests on these results. In the 
baseline regressions, we introduce time period-industry dummies to control for world price 
trends (see section 3.3). An additional way of addressing this issue is by excluding intermediate 
inputs that are particularly affected by volatile prices, as this might affect our measure of GVC 
participation. We show results based on alternative measures of GVC participation that exclude 
the use of intermediates with highly volatile prices (mining products and petroleum). For labour 
productivity, the association based on these alternatives is somewhat lower than in our baseline 
regression, but it remains highly statistically significant and larger for countries further from 
the productivity frontier. In terms of employment growth, the estimates are similar in size to 
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the results in the baseline regression and also not statistically different from 0. Secondly, we 
run all regressions for shorter 5-year periods. The relationship to labour productivity is 
qualitatively similar but somewhat stronger. On employment, the estimated coefficients tend to 
be lower, and we find a negative association on average.  
 
Our results differ from Lopez-Gonzalez (2016), who finds positive effects from GVC 
participation on employment in exports. He studies employment at the level of one aggregated 
manufacturing sector, 11 services sectors, agriculture and mining. Hence, while our approach 
zooms into formal manufacturing employment in manufactured exports, his result might reflect 
more on the employment possibilities outside manufacturing, in particular in services exports, 
which are more important for richer countries. Overall, our results clearly show that, on average, 
higher GVC participation is not positively associated with employment growth in 
manufacturing. This result generalises Formai and Caffarelli (2016), who also study formal 
manufacturing. Their approach is not based on country-specific input-output data but they 
exploit variation in a country’s import share of intermediate imports interacted with an 
industry’s propensity to source (based on the 1997 US input-output table). Yet, the authors also 
find positive productivity effects but no employment effects from GVC participation for a set 
of 50 countries for one period between the 1990s and the 2000s. 
 
3.4.3 Extensions 
We further investigate several avenues to explore heterogeneities of the main result of positive 
productivity but limited employment gains. 
 
Country heterogeneity.  
We firstly explore heterogeneities across country groups. In Table 3.3, we report in column 5 
results for developing countries only (non-high income in 1990, see Table 3.A1). The point 
estimate is positive and statistically different from zero and is slightly larger in magnitude than 
in column 2. This suggests that developing countries are particularly benefitting from GVC 
participation (consistent with the result on distance to the productivity frontier). In column 6, 
we add an interaction with a dummy that is one for all countries located in East and South-East 
Asia. We find a statistically significant difference for Asian countries, and the coefficient is 
more than twice as large. One might argue that Asian countries are engaged differently in GVCs 
compared to other regions. Asian countries might be engaged as buyers of sophisticated 
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intermediate goods, while other regions might be more engaged as upstream suppliers and 
therefore benefit less from backward GVC participation. Further, one might argue that the 
geographic region makes it suitable for benefitting from GVC participation due to 
embeddedness in the global production hub ‘factory Asia’ (e.g., Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 
2015). Strong linkages across countries at different stages of development may offer easy access 
to sophisticated inputs and opportunities to take over production stages as wages rise in the 
relatively more developed countries (in the spirit of the flying geese model). Gereffi (1999) 
illustrates these dynamics within Asia for the textile industry, showing how production shifted 
from Japan in the 1950s to South Asia around 2000. With lacking regional production hubs, 
other developing countries still import intermediates, but might potentially experience less 
learning through cooperation in a dense network of producers.  
 In columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.4, we repeat the exercise for employment growth. We 
find that the average association for developing countries only is not statistically different from 
zero, and the point estimate is close to zero, as in column 2 for the full set of countries. In 
column 6, we show the interaction with the Asia dummy. Yet, even for this group of countries 
with the strongest productivity gains, we do not find a positive association with employment 
growth. While these countries benefit through productivity growth and possibly through rising 
value and output generation, this does not seem to translate into employment growth on average. 
The main results of productivity gains, but limited employment gains even hold for this set of 
countries. 
 
In the supplementary material SM Table 3.1, we further explore heterogeneity across other 
groups. We firstly explore differences of developing countries that have successfully 
transitioned to higher income status. We add an interaction with a dummy that is one for all 
countries that have transitioned to high-income status in 2008 (zero otherwise; column 3), and 
an interaction with a dummy that is one for all countries that transitioned to any higher income 
category between 1990 and 2008 (zero otherwise; column 4). The estimates suggest that the 
positive effect of GVC participation is not only limited to the countries that have generally 
developed successfully, as the estimates for transitioning countries are not statistically different 
from the remaining set of countries. In column 5, we add an interaction with a dummy that is 
one for all countries that capture on average 5% of GDP or more from oil revenues between 
1970 and 2008 (zero otherwise; World Bank, 2018a). These oil-dependent countries may 
participate differently in GVCs (e.g., through forward linkages by selling raw materials), such 
that gains from GVC participation as a buyer are potentially smaller. The point estimate for this 
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group is indeed smaller but not statistically different from the remaining set of non-oil 
dependent countries. 
 We repeat this exercise for employment in SM Table 3.1.B. We find that the average 
association of GVC participation to employment growth is statistically more positive in the 
successful countries that transition to higher income status since 1990 (column 4). The 
estimated coefficient for these transitioning countries is about 0.01 (adding the coefficient for 
the baseline and the interaction), which however is not statistically different from zero (test 
results not reported).  
 
Industry heterogeneity.  
We further explore heterogeneities across exporting industries. GVC participation as measured 
in this study may be potentially more relevant in industries, in which we expect stronger 
backward spillovers. To this end, we attempt to classify exporting industries by sophistication 
of used intermediates. The general idea is that, if a less developed country imports sophisticated 
materials and components to be assembled locally, this may activate learning, for example 
through embodied knowledge. In contrast, assembly of simple inputs or raw materials may 
generate much less learning and the upgrading potential might arise from cooperation with 
global buyers rather than from importing. We classify industries of machinery (ISIC Rev.3 29), 
electronics (30t33) and transport equipment (34t35) as chains using relatively sophisticated 
intermediates. The remaining exporting industries with less sophisticated intermediate use are 
split between light manufacturing, that is, food (15t16), textiles (17t18), leather (19), wood (20), 
paper and printing (21t22) and manufacturing not elsewhere classified (36t37); and resource-
intensive, that is, chemicals (24), rubber (25), non-metallic minerals (26), and metals (27t28).  
 There is no standard classification of industries according to intermediate input use, but 
we can take leads from the literature. Yeats (1998) firstly distinguished trade of parts and 
components from trade of primary inputs using trade data. He argued that the former is more 
relevant for trade in production networks (see also Gaullier et al., 2019). In a similar vein, Rauch 
(1999) distinguished the differentiation of industries by whether the products are reference 
priced, sold on organised exchange or neither. This classification mainly speaks to 
distinguishing primary inputs from more sophisticated parts and components (consumer goods 
are hardly reference priced). We deem our classification to be broadly consistent with these 
ideas, but acknowledge that this is a matter of degree and further research is required in this 
regard.  
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In column 7 of Table 3.3, which is also based on the set of developing countries, we add 
interactions of GVC participation with dummies for the exporting industries with less 
sophisticated inputs and light manufacturing, and for resource-based industries (high 
sophistication is the baseline group). We indeed find a strong effect for the set of industries 
with sophisticated intermediate use, which is larger than the average across all industries in 
column 5. The interaction terms show that the association between GVC participation and 
labour productivity growth is particularly lower in the resource-based exporting industries. The 
point estimate is also lower in the light-manufacturing industries than in the high-sophistication 
industries, but this difference is not statistically significant. The association within all groups 
of industries is still statistically different from zero. This finding indeed points to additional 
benefits from GVC participation, suggesting that industries with sophisticated intermediate 
input use offer more scope for upgrading. Nonetheless, it suggests positive productivity gains 
across all three groups. In SM Table 3.2 in the supplementary material, we further show these 
results for the full set of countries. We also find positive correlations in all three groups of 
industries but we do not find statistical differences across the groups, while the ranking of the 
point estimates is similar.  
 In column 7 of Table 3.4, we repeat the exercise for employment growth. We also find 
the largest coefficient in magnitude for the set of sophisticated industries, but we do not find 
statistical differences across the groups. In all three groups, the association is not statistically 
different from zero. Hence, even in the group of industries in which we find the strongest 
association to productivity growth, we do not identify a positive relation with employment 
growth. The same holds in the set of all countries (SM Table 3.2). In further (non-reported) 
regressions, we estimated the specification with industry dummies for each exporting industry 
individually. Also for specific individual industries, we do not find average positive 
associations with employment. We can interpret this with regard to the main hypothesis in that 
the bias against labour is widespread across all groups of industries. As productivity grows, it 
appears that the scale of production is not sufficiently increasing to generate additional 
employment.  
 
Including non-manufacturing.  
Our chapter focusses on the labour productivity and employment effects in formal 
manufacturing. However, in column 8 of Tables 3.3 and 3.4, we explore employment generation 
including indirect contributions by non-manufacturing. Manufacturing firms may not be able 
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to generate jobs as technology is biased against labour but possibly jobs are created outside 
manufacturing with strong linkages to manufacturing.  
 Besides, by focusing on manufacturing, a possible concern is that one might understate 
employment growth in exports if outsourcing is pervasive. If a firm chooses to specialise in its 
core activity and outsources non-core activities to other domestic non-manufacturing firms 
(most likely to services), a focus on manufacturing understates the growth rate. This is relevant 
if this implies substantial changes in growth rates (i.e., the phenomenon is sizeable) and if it is 
systematically related to GVC participation. One might indeed argue that firms in countries 
with high GVC participation at the beginning of the period continue to seek their comparative 
advantage and therefore specialise in more narrow activities. In this case, our results on 
employment growth would be downward biased. Yet, this only affects our results for 
outsourcing to non-manufacturing because we use chains as our units of observation (not 
separate industries), and jobs outsourced to other manufacturing industries will thus be picked 
up by our employment measure. Secondly, it is not clear that the phenomenon of outsourcing 
(to services) is indeed an important issue in developing countries, as we are not aware of studies 
that systematically document and track this phenomenon in developing countries (on developed 
countries, see Crozet and Milet, 2017; Kelle, 2013). 
 
To explore these issues, we turn to additional data on the other sectors in the economy. We add 
data from the GGDC 10-Sector Database (10SD; de Vries et al., 2015) that covers employment 
for broad sectors in ISIC Rev.3 since the 1960s. We expand our employment accounts by 
information on broad sectors from that database, but use UNIDO’s Indstat for manufacturing 
industries (to keep it consistent with our value-added accounts, and as the 10SD only provides 
total manufacturing). The value-added accounts for broad sectors are consistent, as they are 
based on national accounts in both sources. The employment data of the 10SD is mainly 
obtained through population censuses and therefore covers all economic activities (formal and 
informal). In combination, this yields a dataset of 24 countries (17 developing).  
 We estimate the (total) employment content in exports, and the respective labour 
productivity in exports. For labour productivity growth (column 8, Table 3.3), the estimated 
coefficients are relatively large compared to column 2, but the set of countries is much smaller 
than in our baseline results and not directly comparable. The baseline regression for this smaller 
set of countries for formal manufacturing shows quantitatively similar results as in column 8 
(coefficient equals 0.0278). In terms of employment (column 8 of Table 3.4), we find a negative 
coefficient but it is not statistically different from zero. Again, this coefficient is not directly 
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comparable to column 2 and the estimated coefficient for this smaller set of countries for formal 
manufacturing is -0.0001 (also not statistically different from zero). We also find qualitatively 
similar results for the set of developing countries only (not reported). Hence, taking non-
manufacturing aboard does not alter our main conclusion of productivity gains, but limited 
employment growth. Job generation outside manufacturing also does not seem to be faster in 
country-industries that participate more in GVCs. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
It is sometimes argued that GVCs provide a quick way to industrialise without the need for 
building up a sizeable domestic manufacturing base first. Countries supposedly benefit from 
specialisation in carrying out particular stages in global production networks, realising long-
run productivity and employment growth by gradually moving up the value chain. In this study, 
we investigate whether GVC participation is indeed a possible panacea for weak 
industrialisation trends in the South. The key contribution of our study is to provide long-run 
econometric evidence on the impact of GVC participation on economic upgrading using data 
since 1970 on a large set of developing countries. 
We find robust evidence for a positive productivity effect from stronger GVC 
integration. Moreover, and in line with Rodrik (2013), we find that relatively less productive 
countries can benefit more from GVC participation in terms of productivity growth as they are 
further away from the technology frontier. This speaks against concerns that GVC participation 
is likely to leave developing countries locked in unproductive activities (see Dalle et al., 2013). 
Countries become more productive in performing the same activities through product and 
process upgrading or might move into higher value-adding activities, generally referred to as 
functional upgrading (Gereffi, 1999). Our measurement framework does not distinguish 
between these scenarios, and this is an interesting avenue for further research. There is a need 
for further characterisation of activities in GVCs such as R&D, fabrication or marketing 
activities which differ in their factor requirements and the potential for knowledge spillovers. 
Reijnders and de Vries (2018) and Timmer et al. (2019) provide new evidence on functional 
specialisation based on (cross-country) data on occupations, inspired by the seminal work on 
business functions of Sturgeon and Gereffi (2009).  
 
Our findings on employment generation in the formal manufacturing sector provide a more 
pessimistic outlook than for productivity growth. We do not find evidence for a positive relation 
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between GVC participation and employment growth, even after conditioning on various other 
determinants, neither for 10-year periods nor for shorter 5-year periods. We find some weak 
evidence in favour of positive effects for the poorest countries, but these wear out closer to the 
productivity frontier and turn significantly negative at productivity levels characteristic for 
middle-income countries.  
We conclude that GVC participation is a mixed blessing at best: on average stimulating 
productivity growth but not employment growth. We hypothesise, in the vein of Rodrik (2018), 
that this is due to bias against (unskilled) labour in modern technologies that are diffusing 
throughout GVCs, driven by stringent requirements from multinational lead firms in the chains. 
 
We would like to stress a number of caveats to our findings. First, we focus on the formal 
manufacturing sector and do not study the impact of GVC participation on  employment 
generation outside the formal sector. For example, formal manufacturing firms might outsource 
particular labour-intensive tasks to households and micro firms with irregular and informal 
workers (on India, e.g., Moreno-Monroy et al., 2014). One might even argue that the success 
of the formal sector in exporting and productivity growth depends crucially on its ability to 
exploit networks of informal workers (Gereffi, 2014). Given lack of reliable data on irregular 
employment, we have no way of testing this. We focus on formal firms as it is organised work 
that is ultimately needed for operating the scale and technologies of modern industrialisation. 
Moreover, working conditions and pay are generally better than in irregular and informal jobs. 
Another potential employment spillover lies in the outsourcing of services by formal 
manufacturing. There is limited systematic evidence on the extent and in particular on the rise 
of services outsourcing in developing countries. In additional exploratory analysis, we find no 
evidence of job creation when we include indirect non-manufacturing in relation to GVC 
participation. It is an interesting avenue for future research relating to the broader debate on the 
role of business services in structural change over the course of development (e.g., Lavopa and 
Szirmai, 2018). 
Another caveat is the possible wedge between labour productivity and (real) wage 
growth. Bernhardt and Milberg (2013) and Bernhardt and Pollak (2016) argue that the latter is 
more relevant from a welfare perspective. Correlation between the two is strongly positive in 
the medium to long-run, but not necessarily in the short-run, in particular in countries with 
labour markets characterised by surplus labour in the vein of Lewis (1954), see also Sen (2019). 
It also raises the question of the governance structure and the bargaining power of firms 
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involved in GVCs, as these are prime determinants of the distribution of income across the 
GVC participants (Strange and Humphrey, 2019).  
Lastly, while we were able to expand the set of lower income countries in our analysis, 
and trace their development over a longer period, there is still scope to expand coverage. This 
is particularly true for the least developed countries in Africa and Asia, which are typically not 
covered as the analysis puts high demands on the data (such as detailed employment statistics 
and input-output data). It might be that they experience upgrading dynamics in GVCs that are 
different from the relatively richer developing countries analysed in this study. In particular 
resource-rich countries are likely to engage differently in GVCs as forward suppliers, relying 
more on market knowledge and access spillovers from MNE buyers and less on spillovers in 
the use of sophisticated inputs (e.g., Ivarsson & Alvstam, 2010; Havranek & Irsova, 2011).  
 
More generally, we like to emphasise that our cross-country study should be seen as a 
complement to country case studies that do more justice to the large heterogeneity across sectors 
and countries, and the important idiosyncrasies in countries’ institutional settings. In particular, 
our findings do not rule out that some countries have successfully relied on GVC production as 
a stepping stone for both productivity and employment creation. China and Thailand, for 
example, have both successfully developed through GVC participation (Wad, 2009; Kee and 
Tang, 2016). Gereffi and Sturgeon (2013) argue that such success depends on new and GVC-
specific industrial policies. The authors emphasise the developmental role of local firms serving 
multiple multinational lead firms at the same time, the so-called ‘global suppliers’. They 
suggest that countries must attract such global suppliers to generate employment and to allow 
local firms to have access to world-class inputs through domestic sourcing of global suppliers. 
We find that Asian countries have benefitted in particular from GVC participation, which may 
indeed be due to their nurturing of sophisticated suppliers and the development of regional 
supply networks (Coe and Yeung, 2015). Critical in the assessment is whether the conditions 
for success are in reach today for developing countries that are typically small and cannot built 
from a base supported by buoyant domestic demand. More generally, Rodrik (2018) advocates 
close cooperation between public and private entities to identify and evaluate the bottlenecks 
to generating linkages between the highly productive (exporting) firms and the rest of the 
economy. Kummritz et al. (2017) have explored policy-related correlates that matter for 
generating value added. We believe it is an important future avenue to explore similar correlates 
in terms of employment and labour productivity. Case-study approaches are well-suited to 
suggest and refine hypotheses on why a particular country deviates positively or negatively 
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from the average. We conclude that economic upgrading through GVC participation is possible, 
but far from automatic.  
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3.6 Appendix: additional table  














    N T N T     N T N T 
Argentina LM 26 2 52 4 Kuwait H 52 4 89 7 
Australia H 26 2 39 3 Latvia UM 13 1 26 2 
Austria H 52 4 91 7 Lithuania UM 13 1 26 2 
Azerbaijan LM - - 13 1 Malaysia LM 52 4 91 7 
Bangladesh L 36 3 73 6 Mexico UM 26 2 52 4 
Belgium H 52 4 91 7 Morocco LM 39 3 78 6 
Brazil UM 13 1 26 2 Netherlands H 52 4 91 7 
Bulgaria LM 13 1 26 2 New Zealand H 13 1 26 2 
Canada H 52 4 91 7 Norway H 52 4 91 7 
Chile LM 52 4 91 7 Peru LM 13 1 39 3 
China L 26 2 65 5 Philippines LM 52 4 91 7 
Colombia LM 52 4 91 7 Poland LM 52 4 91 7 
Cyprus H 39 3 78 6 Portugal UM 52 4 91 7 
Czech Rep. LM 13 1 26 2 Romania LM 13 1 26 2 
Denmark H 52 4 91 7 Russia UM 13 1 26 2 
Ecuador LM 49 4 89 7 Saudi Arabia UM 13 1 26 2 
Egypt L 52 4 89 7 Senegal LM 8 1 24 2 
Estonia UM 13 1 26 2 Singapore H 52 4 91 7 
Finland H 52 4 91 7 Slovakia LM 13 1 26 2 
France H 52 4 91 7 Slovenia UM 13 1 26 2 
Germany H 13 1 39 3 South Africa UM 26 2 65 5 
Greece UM 13 1 26 2 South Korea UM 52 4 91 7 
Hungary UM 52 4 91 7 Spain H 52 4 91 7 
India L 52 4 91 7 Sri Lanka L 26 2 65 5 
Ireland H 52 4 91 7 Sweden H 52 4 91 7 
Israel H 52 4 91 7 Thailand LM 52 4 91 7 
Japan H 52 4 91 7 Turkey LM 52 4 91 7 
Jordan LM 25 2 63 5 Uruguay UM 50 4 89 7 
Kenya L 35 3 72 6 USA H 52 4 91 7 
Note: Income level is the World Bank income classification of 1990 (or closest available year). H is high 
income, UM is upper middle, LM is lower middle, L is low income. N is the number of observations, T is the 
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3.7 Supplementary material: robustness and data construction 
SM A. Additional Tables 
SM Table 3.1. GVC participation and economic outcomes, country heterogeneity. 
SM 3.1.A. Labour productivity 
Dependent variable: Growth of formal manufacturing labour productivity in exports 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
GVC participation (ln) 0.0136*** 0.0214*** 0.0225*** 0.0182** 0.0220*** 0.0139** 
 (0.00301) (0.00497) (0.00554) (0.00727) (0.00529) (0.00545) 
GVC participation x High-income 2008   -0.00453    
   (0.00776)    
GVC participation x Transition 2008    0.00585   
    (0.00727)   
GVC participation x Oil     -0.00488  
     (0.0102)  
GVC participation x Asia      0.0225*** 
      (0.00730) 
Constant 0.124*** 0.167*** 0.169*** 0.173*** 0.168*** 0.152*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0233) (0.0242) (0.0229) (0.0237) (0.0234) 
       
Observations 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 
Countries 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Adjusted R-squared 0.230 0.461 0.461 0.461 0.461 0.466 
Time period-industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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SM Table 3.1.B. Employment 
Dependent variable: Growth of formal manufacturing employment in exports 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
GVC participation (ln) -0.00166 -0.00239 0.00147 -0.0190 -0.00374 0.000807 
 (0.00642) (0.0102) (0.0108) (0.0147) (0.0106) (0.0120) 
GVC participation x High-income 2008   -0.0153    
   (0.0174)    
GVC participation x Transition 2008    0.0304**   
    (0.0152)   
GVC participation x Oil     0.0106  
     (0.0282)  
GVC participation x Asia      -0.00954 
      (0.0149) 
Constant 0.0650** 0.0127 0.0220 0.0434 0.00976 0.0191 
 (0.0260) (0.0403) (0.0408) (0.0398) (0.0412) (0.0420) 
       
Observations 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 1,152 
Countries 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Adjusted R-squared 0.107 0.178 0.177 0.180 0.177 0.177 
Time period-industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All 
independent variables are measured at the beginning of each period. High-income is a dummy for all 
developing countries that reach high-income status in 2008. Transition is a dummy for all developing 
countries that transition to higher income group. Oil is a dummy for all countries that generate 5% of GDP or 
more from oil revenues. Asia is a dummy for all countries in East and South-East Asia. 
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SM Table 3.2. GVC participation and economic outcomes, industry heterogeneity. 
  
Dependent variable: Growth of formal 
manufacturing labour productivity in exports 
Dependent variable: Growth of formal 
manufacturing employment in exports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Full sample Developing countries Full sample Developing countries 
     
GVC participation (ln) 0.0242*** 0.0328*** 0.00544 0.00149 
 (0.00501) (0.00741) (0.00938) (0.0149) 
GVC participation x light Mfg -0.00382 -0.00985 -0.00954 -0.0121 
 (0.00482) (0.00789) (0.00908) (0.0165) 
GVC participation x resource-
based Mfg 
-0.00610 -0.0156** -0.00759 -0.00225 
(0.00426) (0.00690) (0.00875) (0.0153) 
     
Constant 0.182*** 0.158*** 0.0126 0.0156 
 (0.0182) (0.0234) (0.0276) (0.0421) 
     
Observations 2,088 1,152 2,088 1,152 
Countries 57 37 57 37 
Adjusted R-squared 0.530 0.463 0.215 0.177 
Time period-industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All 
independent variables are measured at the beginning of each period. Industry dummies as described in the text. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on described dataset. 
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SM B. Robustness 
As indicated in section 3.3, price development might be a concern for our estimation. In the 
baseline regressions, we introduce time period-industry dummies to control for world price 
trends. An additional way of addressing the issue is by excluding intermediate inputs that are 
particularly affected by volatile prices. This is of particular interest as GVC participation is 
measured as the share of foreign value added in exports. If prices of specific intermediates rise, 
countries that import those products will show relatively higher GVC participation and 
countries that produce those domestically will show relatively lower GVC participation. To 
provide a check on this, we use two alternative measures of GVC participation that exclude 
intermediates of the broad sector mining and electricity (ISIC Rev.3 C and E), and of ‘refined 
petroleum’ (23). Two sectors that are arguably most prone to volatile prices. 
 We firstly follow Hummels et al. (2001) by setting all imports of the respective sectors 
to 0 and recalculate the measure of GVC participation. This implicitly assumes that the 
respective imports are produced domestically. By definition, this first alternative GVC 
participation measure is smaller than the original one in all countries but closer to the original 
one in countries that produce those products domestically (i.e., resource-abundant ones). 
Secondly, we construct our own alternative GVC participation measure by setting imports and 
domestic production of the two sectors to 0, and then recalculate domestic and foreign value 
added in exports. The sum of both is a hypothetical export value excluding any value from 
mining/electricity and refined petroleum. By construction, these hypothetical export values are 
smaller than the original values. We then recalculate our measure of GVC participation, which 
thus depicts the share of foreign value added in exports if production did not use any of the 
excluded products. These shares are smaller than the original ones if the country is using 
relatively more domestic than imported intermediates of the two sectors (i.e., in resource-
abundant countries), and vice versa. 
 We show the results in SM Table 3.3 in columns 1 and 2 for labour productivity and in 
columns 3 and 4 for employment. Columns 1 and 3 use our own alternative and columns 2 and 
4 follow Hummels et al. (2001). For labour productivity, the association based on these 
alternatives is indeed somewhat lower than in our baseline regression. Yet, the association 
remains highly statistically significant. In terms of employment growth, the estimates are close 
to the result in the baseline regression and economically close to and statistically not different 
from 0. In unreported results, we also find qualitatively similar results including the interaction 
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with labour productivity (as in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.3 and 3.4), and if we limit the set of 
countries to developing countries only (column 5 of Table 3.3 and 3.4).  
 
We perform a second robustness check by splitting our sample in 5-year periods instead of 10-
year periods. While our focus is on the longer 10-year periods, we explore whether we find 
differences by length of period. In SM Table 3.4, we present the main regression results for 5-
year periods (5-year steps between 1971 and 2006). We repeat the baseline regressions in 
columns 1 and 2 for labour productivity and in 3 and 4 for employment. Overall, the coefficients 
for labour productivity are larger but show the same qualitative relationship. On employment, 
this is also true while the estimated coefficients tend to be lower. The average association is 
negative and statistically different from zero (column 3). We further run all regressions of the 
extensions discussed in section 3.4.3 in 5-year periods, finding qualitatively similar results (not 
reported). It overall suggests that our result of positive productivity but limited employment 
gains, obtained for 10-year periods, can similarly be concluded from 5-year periods. 
 
SM Table 3.3. GVC participation and economic outcomes, alternative measurement 
  
Dependent variable: Growth of formal 
manufacturing labour productivity in exports 
Dependent variable: Growth of formal 
manufacturing employment in exports 









    
GVC participation (ln) 0.0150*** 0.0120*** 0.00250 0.00637 
 (0.00348) (0.00349) (0.00703) (0.00692) 
     
Constant 0.171*** 0.163*** 0.0250 0.0361 
 (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0255) (0.0253) 
     
Observations 2,088 2,088 2,088 2,088 
Countries 57 57 57 57 
Adjusted R-squared 0.526 0.524 0.215 0.216 
Time period-industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Note: Robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All independent 
variables are measured at the beginning of each period. In columns 1 and 4, GVC participation is based on an 
alternative specification excluding domestic and foreign mining/electricity and refined oil intermediates. In 
columns 2 and 5, GVC participation is based on an alternative specification treating foreign mining/electricity and 
refined oil intermediates as domestic (following Hummels et al., 2001).  
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SM Table 3.4. GVC participation and economic outcomes, 5-year periods 
  
Dependent variable: Growth of formal 
manufacturing labour productivity in exports 
Dependent variable: Growth of formal 
manufacturing employment in exports 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    
GVC participation (ln) 0.0405*** 0.0897** -0.0204** 0.00135 
 (0.00635) (0.0365) (0.00929) (0.0439) 
Labour productivity (ln)  -0.0892***  0.00826 
  (0.00673)  (0.0110) 
GVC participation x labour 
productivity 
 -0.00797*  -0.00202 
 (0.00430)  (0.00474) 
Constant 0.386*** 0.860*** 0.0970* 0.0700 
 (0.0290) (0.0546) (0.0503) (0.0902) 
     
Observations 3,877 3,877 3,877 3,877 
Countries 58 58 58 58 
Adjusted R-squared 0.377 0.492 0.147 0.147 
Time period-industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All independent 
variables are measured at the beginning of each time period. 
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SM C. Time series of formal manufacturing employment and value added 
In this section, we describe the data construction of the series of formal manufacturing 
employment and value added. Our dataset covers an unbalanced sample of 58 countries of 
which 38 are non-high-income countries (see Table 3.A1).  
The construction of the series of employment and value added relies mainly on the 
UNIDO Industrial Statistics database (UNIDO Indstat2, 2016). In some cases, these data are 
complemented by other sources to bridge small gaps in the data. As described in the main text, 
the construction is guided to maximize intertemporal (over time), internal (between variables), 
and international (cross-country) consistency by applying linking procedures. We proceed as 
follows. 
In the first step, we clean the data. We set observations to missing which we identify as 
erroneous entries. Firstly, we set all negative entries of value added and employment to missing. 
Secondly, we treat zeros and missing observations. In the raw data, zeros might appear when 
data is missing, that is, when the industry is not sampled in the respective year. It can, however, 
also indicate that the actual value is zero.33 We therefore set zeros to missing that (i) are entered 
in-between recorded values. Hence, if an industry has a positive value in year 1, a zero in year 
2, but a positive value in year 3, we assume that the zero in-between is a missing value. We set 
observations to missing if (ii) the industry records zeros at the beginning or end of the time 
series, but emerges from 0% to more than 5% of total manufacturing, and vice versa. Hence, 
we allow for the possibility that industries emerge or vanish, but restrict it to a change of 5% in 
total manufacturing. We assume that larger changes from or to zero indicate missing data. We 
do not set observations to missing if only zeros are recorded in one industry, and thus allow for 
the possibility that some industries do not exist at all. We also set observations to missing if 
(iii) a positive value is recorded in the other variable. For example, if employment data is 
recorded, but value added is reported as zero, we treat the zero as a missing value.  
Having obtained the cleaned value added and employment data, we aggregate into the 
14 ISIC Rev.3 categories: 15t16, 17t18, 19, 20, 21t22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27t28, 29, 30t33, 34t35, 
36t37. We additionally construct aggregate categories for 17t19 and 29t33, because almost all 
countries report the categories 18t19 and 29t30 together in years before the 1990s, such that we 
cannot aggregate into our classification. This provides aggregated series of 14 industries plus 
the two higher aggregates of value added and employment in three and two different 
 
33 A motivating example for this treatment is Senegal. Between 1986 and 1989, no industry records any value 
added and employment except for recycling and food manufacturing. After this period, all remaining industries 
start recording again. It is very unlikely that all industries disappear in the same year and return in the same year. 
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classifications, respectively. Value added is reported in basic prices, in market prices and in 
unreported classification; employment as persons engaged and employees. To bridge gaps 
within these five series, we linearly interpolate the series. If the two more aggregated categories 
are available but not the disaggregated ones, we use the closest available split to obtain the 
disaggregated categories. Per country, we obtain up to five series for the two variables, 
aggregated to the 14 manufacturing industries. 
We use these aggregated data to obtain initial cross-sections for both variables. To 
assure international consistency, we take the latest available value added cross-section in basic 
prices and employment cross-section as employees. If these classifications are not available, 
we prefer value added in basic prices over market prices over unreported classification, and 
employment as employees over persons engaged. Both cross-sections come from the same year 
to assure internal consistency.  
We extrapolate these cross-sections backward and forward by growth-rate series, which 
we construct as follows. Firstly, starting from the aggregated data, we calculate the growth rates 
within each of the variable-classification series, that is, of up to five series per country. 
Secondly, we combine these series into one single series of growth rates for each of the two 
variables. We thus assume that the growth rates are consistent across different classifications. 
When combining these growth rates into one single series, we prefer growth rates in basic prices 
over market prices over unreported classification. For employment, we prefer the series in 
employees over the series in persons engaged.34 These constructed growth rates account for 
almost all derived data points in our data. 
Next, we complement these series with additional sources and assumptions to bridge 
small gaps, for example, if there is no overlap between series in different classifications. Firstly, 
we add data from the OECD (OECD, 2017). This database provides total (formal and informal) 
manufacturing employment for up to 17 manufacturing industries. We use this data source to 
backdate and extrapolate, and to bridge gaps in our series of formal manufacturing employment 
and value added. By using this data source, we assume that the growth rates of total 
manufacturing are consistent with the growth rate of formal manufacturing. For France and 
South Korea, we also add data from KLEMS (Jäger, 2017; ASIA KLEMS, 2017), and proxy 
the growth rates following the same assumption. We further bridge the remaining small gaps 
of mostly single years, but of up to four years, by assuming a common trend of labour 
productivity growth across manufacturing industries. This is only done if there is no overlap 
 
34 This procedure assures that we always start the extrapolation with growth rates of the same classification as 
the initial cross-section. 
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between two classifications of value added, which could not be repaired by the additional data 
sources. It occurs in 14 countries. SM Table 3.5 provides an overview of the data sources and 
time period coverage for each of the individual countries. 
 
Legend for SM Table 3.5. 
 Meaning 
1 Growth rates are based on raw data 
a 
Growth rates are based on raw data, but use of higher aggregates 17t19 and/or 29t33 for respective 
industries 
i 
Growth rates for one or more industries are obtained from linear interpolation between raw data 
points 
o Growth rates for one or more industries are obtained from OECD (2017) 
k Growth rates for one or more industries are obtained from KLEMS 
m Growth rates of VA are based on common manufacturing trend of value added per worker  
E Employment classified as employees 
PE Employment classified as persons engaged 
B Value added classified in basic prices 
M Value added classified in market prices 
NR Value added classification is not reported 
 
Note that the classification is not indicated in SM Table 3.5 if the cross-section for extrapolation 
is after 2008. All of those countries report employment as employees, except Uruguay 
(reporting persons engaged). All countries report value added in basic prices, except Cyprus, 





SM Table 3.5. Overview of sources by country 
  70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 
ARG EMP                             1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia ia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 E o o o o o o 
  VA                             1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a m m m 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 M o o o o o o 
AUS EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a E                   
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a B                   
AUT EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia 1 1 1 1 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1 1i 1i 1i 1i 1 1i 1i 1i 
  VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a m 1 1 1 1 1 1i o 1 1 1 1 1i 1i 1i 1i 1 1i 1i 1i 
AZE EMP                                1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA                                1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BEL EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1iao iao iao 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BGD EMP       1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia ia 1 i i 1 i i i i i i i 1i i i 
 VA       1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a m m m 1m i i 1 i i i i i i i 1i i i 
BGR EMP                                                   ia 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  VA                                                   iao 1a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 o 1 
BRA EMP                          1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia iao 1 
 VA                          1ao 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CAN EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a E 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CHL EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a E 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a M 1i 1ao 1ao 1ao 1ao 1iao 1iao 1iao 1iao 1iao 1iao 1iao 1iao 1ao 
CHN EMP                     1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 E 1 
  VA                     1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a o 1 1 1 1 M o 
COL EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CYP EMP     1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1         
  VA     1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 1 1         
CZE EMP                          1 1 1 1 1 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1i 1 
 VA                          1 1 1 1 o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1i 1 
DEU EMP                                               1 1 o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  VA                                               o o o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DNK EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 E 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia ia ia 1 1 1 1 B 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 
ECU EMP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1i 1 1 1 1 E 
  VA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1i 1 1 1i 1 1 1 1 M 
EGY EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a E ia ia ia ia ia ia ia 1 1 i i i 1 i 1 1i 1 i i 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1ia 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a B 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 i i i 1i i 1i 1i 1 ia ia 
ESP EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia ia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EST EMP                        1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1i 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1i 1 
 VA                        1 1 1 1i 1 1 o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1i 1 
FIN EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 E 1 
  VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia ia ia ia ia ia ia 1 1 1 1 1 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1 B 1 
FRA EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1 1 1 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a m 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a m 1k 1k 1k 1ik 1k 1k 1 1 1 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GRC EMP                                               1 1 1 1 1 1 i i i i 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  VA                                               1 1 1 1 1 1 i i i i 1 1 1 1 1 1 
HUN EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia ia 1i 1i 1i 1i 1 1 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1ia 1a 1ia 1a 1ao o 1 1 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 




SM Table 3.5 (continued). Overview of sources by country 
  70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 
IND EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia ia ia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IRL EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia E 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1a 1ia 1ia 
  VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1i 1i 1i 1i B 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 
ISR EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia E 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia ia ia ia ia ia 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a M o 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 
JOR EMP                     1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia 1 1i 1i 1i i 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  VA                     1ia 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1i 1i 1i 1 1 1i 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1 
JPN EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia ia ia ia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
KEN EMP     1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1ia PE ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia 
  VA     1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1a 1a B 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
KOR EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a E 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a M k 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
KWT EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia ia 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
LKA EMP                   1a 1a E ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia ia ia ia 1 1 1 
  VA                   1a 1a B ia 1a ia ia ia 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia ia ia ia 1 1 1 
LTU EMP                          1i 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA                          o o o o o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1i 
LVA EMP                                               1i 1i 1i E 1i 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
  VA                                               1 1i 1 B 1io 1io 1io 1io 1io 1io 1io 1io 1io 1io 1io 1io 
MAR EMP       1a 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA       1a 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia 1 1i 1i 1 1 1i 1i 1 1 
MEX EMP                             1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1i 1i 1i 1i i i i i i i i i i 1 i i i i 1i 
  VA                             1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1i 1i 1i 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 
MYS EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia E 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia B o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NLD EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1i 1i 1 1i 1 1i 1i 1i 1i 1 1 1 
  VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1i 1 1i 
NOR EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1 1i 1i 1i 1i 1 1 1 1i 1i 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 m 1 1 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1 1 1 1i 1i 
NZL EMP 1a 1a 1a ia 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a E                                               
  VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a M                                               
PER EMP             1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia 1a 1 1 i i i i 1 1 PE      
 VA             1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia m 1 1 i i i i 1i 1i NR      
PHL EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 i 1 i 1 i 1 1 i 1 
  VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 i 1 i 1 i 1 1 i 1 
POL EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1i 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 o 1 1 1 1i 1i i 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1i 
PRT EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia ia ia ia ia ia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 
  VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1ia 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a o 1 1 1 1 1i 1 1 1 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 
ROU EMP                                                   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 E 1 1 1 
  VA                                                   1o 1o 1o 1o 1o 1o 1o o 1ao 1 B 1ao 1ao 1iao 
RUS EMP                           1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA                           1 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
SAU EMP                                                   ia ia ia ia ia ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia E 1 1 
 VA                                                   o o o o o o o 1iao 1iao 1iao 1iao NR o o 




SM Table5 (continued). Overview of sources by country 
  70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 
SEN EMP                   ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia 1 1 1 1 E       
 VA                   1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia 1ia M       
SGP EMP ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia ia 1 1 1 1 E 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1i 1 1 1 1 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 B o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1i 1 1 1 1 
SVK EMP                        1 1 1 1 1 E 1 1i 1 1 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i i 
 VA                        1 m 1 1 1 B 1 1i 1 1 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 
SVN EMP                                        1a 1a 1a 1i 1i 1i 1i 1i 1 1 1 1i 1 1 1 1 E 
 VA                                        1a 1a m 1o 1o 1o 1o 1o 1i 1i 1i 1i 1 1 1i 1i B 
SWE EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
THA EMP 1a 1a ia ia 1a 1a 1a 1a ia 1ia ia ia 1a ia 1a ia 1a ia 1a 1a 1ia 1a ia 1a 1a ia 1 i E i 1 i 1 i i i 1 i I 
 VA 1ia ia ia ia 1a 1a 1a 1a ia 1ia ia ia 1a ia 1a ia 1a ia 1a 1a 1ia 1a ia 1a 1a ia 1 i M o o i 1 i i i 1 i I 
TUR EMP 1a 1a ia ia 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a m 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
URY EMP ia ia 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a ia 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 1i 1i 1i 1i i 1 1 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1 1 1 1 1i 1i 1i 1i i ia 1 
USA EMP 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a E ia 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a B o o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ZAF EMP                   1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a E 1a ia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 VA                   1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a 1a B m ia 1i i i 1i i 1i 1o 1o 1o 1o 1o 1o 1o 1o 1o 1o 
Note: 1 indicates that at least one industry’s growth rate is based on raw data; a indicates that industries 17t18 and 19, and/or 29 and 30t33 are based on an aggregate split of 
the raw data;  i indicates that at least one industry’s growth is based on linear interpolation; o indicates that at least one industry’s growth is based on data from OECD; k 
indicates that at least one industry’s growth is based on KLEMS data; m indicates that at least one industry’s value added growth is based on aggregate trend of value added 
per worker. 
 
 
